Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/192588 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers No. 606
Verlag: 
Statistics Norway, Research Department, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
In the longer run, effects on R&D and the implementation of advanced abatement technology may be at least as important as short-run cost effectiveness when we evaluate public environmental policy. In this paper, we show that the number of firms that adopt advanced abatement technology could be higher with emissions trading than with a tax if there is imperfect competition in the permits market. Under perfect competition, the number would always be higher with a tax, given that the regulator is myopic. If we allow for environmental policy response, the ranking is still ambiguous under imperfect competition, while the regimes become equal with perfect competition.
Schlagwörter: 
Auctioned permits
Emissions taxes
technology adoption
Cournot competition
JEL: 
H23
Q55
Q58
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
295.03 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.