Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/192517 
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers No. 535
Publisher: 
Statistics Norway, Research Department, Oslo
Abstract: 
This paper examines the impact of performance-related pay on wage differentials within firms. Our theoretical framework predicts that, compared to a fixed pay system, pay schemes based on individual effort increase within-firm wage inequality, while group-based bonuses have minor effects on wage dispersion. Theory also predicts an interaction between performance-related pay and union bargaining, where union power reduces the impact of performance pay on wage dispersion. The empirical contribution utilizes two recent Norwegian employer surveys, linked to a full set of employee records. A longitudinal sub-sample allows for identification based on fixed establishment effects. Introduction of performance-related pay is shown to raise residual wage inequality in nonunion firms, but not in firms with high union density. Our findings suggest that even though performance-related pay appears to be on the rise, the overall impact on wage dispersion is likely to be small, particularly in European countries with strong unions.
Subjects: 
Performance related pay
wage inequality
union bargaining
JEL: 
J31
J33
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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