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dc.contributor.authorKohler, Marionen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:56:39Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:56:39Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19230-
dc.description.abstractIn Kohler (2002) we analyse coalition formation in monetary policy coordination games between n countries. We find that positive spillovers of the coalition formation process and the resulting free-rider problem limit the stable coalition size: since the coalition members are bound by the union's discipline, an outsider can successfully export inflation without fearing that the insiders will try to do the same. In this paper, based on the same model, we allow countries to join competing coalitions. The formation of a large currency bloc is not sustainable since it would impose too much discipline on all participants. However, the co-existence of several smaller currency blocs may be a second-best solution to the free-riding problem of monetary policy coordination.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA) |cHamburgen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aHWWA Discussion Paper |x258en
dc.subject.jelF42en
dc.subject.jelF33en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCurrency unionsen
dc.subject.keywordinternational policy coordinationen
dc.subject.keywordFree-ridingen
dc.subject.keywordCoalition formationen
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitiken
dc.subject.stwInternationale wirtschaftspolitische Koordinationen
dc.subject.stwKoalitionen
dc.subject.stwWährungsunionen
dc.subject.stwWährungsraumen
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwInstitutioneller Wettbewerben
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleCompeting coalitions in international monetary policy games-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn37731420Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:hwwadp:26274en

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