Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19230
Authors: 
Kohler, Marion
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
HWWA Discussion Paper 258
Abstract: 
In Kohler (2002) we analyse coalition formation in monetary policy coordination games between n countries. We find that positive spillovers of the coalition formation process and the resulting free-rider problem limit the stable coalition size: since the coalition members are bound by the union?s discipline, an outsider can successfully export inflation without fearing that the insiders will try to do the same. In this paper, based on the same model, we allow countries to join competing coalitions. The formation of a large currency bloc is not sustainable since it would impose too much discipline on all participants. However, the co-existence of several smaller currency blocs may be a second-best solution to the free-riding problem of monetary policy coordination.
Subjects: 
Currency unions
international policy coordination
Free-riding
Coalition formation
JEL: 
F42
F33
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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