Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/192261 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers No. 279
Verlag: 
Statistics Norway, Research Department, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies the formation of social norms for considerate smoking behavior. Being considerate gives smokers a higher social approval from non-smokers, but imposes an inconvenience cost. A non-smoker's disapproval of inconsiderate smoking is assumed to be stronger the less used he is to being exposed to passive smoking. The analysis shows that introduction of a smoking regulation may move the society from an initial no-consideration Nash equilibrium to a Nash equilibrium in which every smoker is considerate, even in the unregulated zone. This crowding in of considerate behavior will prevail even after policy reversal. Empirical evidence confirms that a shift in social norms on considerate smoking has taken place in Norway after the smoking law amendments in 1988, and supports the plausibility of model assumptions.
Schlagwörter: 
Passive smoking
regulation
social norms
evolutionary game theory.
JEL: 
C72
D11
I18
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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