Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/191785 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEF Discussion Papers on Development Policy No. 266
Verlag: 
University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
A country that experiences a shortage of workers with particular skills naturally considers two responses: import skills or produce them. Skill import may result in large-scale migration, which will not be to the liking of the natives. Skill production will require financial incentives, which will not be to the liking of the ministry of finance. In this paper we suggest a third response: impose a substantial migration admission fee, "import" fee-paying workers regardless of their skills, and use the revenue from the fee to subsidize the acquisition of the required skills by the natives. We calculate the minimal fee that will remedy the shortage of workers with particular skills with fewer migrants than under the skill "import" policy.
Schlagwörter: 
skill heterogeneity
production externalities
market inefficiency
shortage of particular skills
social planner's choice
"Import" of skills
a migration admission fee
skill acquisition subsidy
JEL: 
D62
F22
J24
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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