Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/191419
Authors: 
Kwon, Suehyun
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7394
Abstract: 
This paper studies optimal mechanisms for selling complementary goods sequentially. The seller starts with private information, has limited commitment and offers in the first period a menu of information structures on the value of the second-period product. Fully revealing the seller type in the first period makes the second period a standard adverse selection problem, and fully revealing the buyer type in the first period makes the second period an information design problem. Among properties of equilibria, all types of seller must pool in every equilibrium if certain first-order stochastic dominance and independence conditions are satisfied.
Subjects: 
information design
dynamic informed-principal problem
interdependent values
limited commitment
Myerson-Satterthwaite
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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