Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/191408
Authors: 
Gerlagh, Reyer
Heijmans, Roweno J.R.K.
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 7383
Abstract: 
We develop a dynamic regulation game for a stock externality under asymmetric information and future market uncertainty. Within this framework, regulation is characterized as the implementation of a welfare-maximization program conditional on informational constraints. We identify the most general executable programs and find these yield simple and intuitive time-consistent policy rules that implement the stochastic first best as long as a future market exists. We apply our theory to carbon dioxide emissions trading schemes and find substantial welfare gains are possible, compared to current practices.
Subjects: 
asymmetric information
regulatory instruments
policy updating
emission trading
pollution
climate change
JEL: 
H23
Q54
Q58
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.