Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/191398
Authors: 
Hackmann, Martin Benjamin
Pohl, R. Vincent
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 7373
Abstract: 
How do patient and provider incentives affect mode and cost of long-term care? Our analysis of 1 million nursing home stays yields three main insights. First, Medicaid-covered residents prolong their stays instead of transitioning to community-based care due to limited cost-sharing. Second, nursing homes shorten Medicaid stays when capacity binds to admit more profitable out-of-pocket payers. Third, providers react more elastically to financial incentives than patients, so moving to episode-based provider reimbursement is more effective in shortening Medicaid stays than increasing resident cost-sharing. Moreover, we do not find evidence for health improvements due to longer stays for marginal Medicaid beneficiaries.
Subjects: 
long-term care
nursing homes
patient incentives
provider incentives
cost-sharing
episode-based reimbursement
medicaid
JEL: 
H51
H75
I11
I13
I18
J14
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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