Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/191393
Authors: 
Dato, Simon
Feess, Eberhard
Nieken, Petra
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 7368
Abstract: 
Recent literature has shown that lying behavior in the laboratory can well be explained by a combination of lying costs and reputation concerns. We extend the literature on lying behavior to strategic interactions. As reciprocal behavior is important in many interactions, we study a theoretical model on reciprocity where a player's altruism depends on her perception of the other player’s altruism towards herself. We analyze a sequential two-player contest and vary the second mover’s information on the first movers lying behavior. This allows us to derive predictions on the second mover’s behavior which we test empirically in a large scale online experiment and in the laboratory. In both experiments, the second mover’s lying propensity does not depend on whether the first mover has (possibly) lied or not. This robust behavioral pattern provides strong evidence that reciprocity does not play a role for lying behavior in our setting.
Subjects: 
private information
lying
reciprocity
JEL: 
C90
D82
D91
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Social Media Mentions:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.