Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19134 
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dc.contributor.authorEnglmaier, Florianen
dc.contributor.authorReisinger, Markusen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:55:17Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:55:17Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19134-
dc.description.abstractThe industrialization process of a country is often plagued by a failure to coordinateinvestment decisions. Using the Global Games approach we can solve this coordinationproblem and eliminate the problem of multiple equilibria. We show how appropriateinformation provision enhances efficiency. We discuss extensions of the model and argue thatsubsidies may be a property of a signalling equilibrium to overcome credibility problems ininformation provision. In addition we point out possible problems with overreaction to publicinformation. Furthermore, we suggest a new focus for development policy.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1670en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelF21en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelO14en
dc.subject.jelO12en
dc.subject.jelC79en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordinformationen
dc.subject.keywordcoordinationen
dc.subject.keywordindustrializationen
dc.subject.keyworddevelopmenten
dc.subject.keywordglobal gamesen
dc.subject.keywordequilibrium refinementsen
dc.subject.keywordbig pushen
dc.subject.stwIndustrialisierungen
dc.subject.stwInvestitionen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwInvestitionspolitiken
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungspolitiken
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten
dc.titleInformation, coordination, and the industrialization of countries-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn510022723en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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