Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/191255
Authors: 
Serra-Garcia, Marta
Szech, Nora
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
KIT Working Paper Series in Economics No. 120
Publisher: 
Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON), Karlsruhe
Abstract: 
We investigate the elasticity of preferences for moral ignorance with respect to monetary incentives and social norm information. We propose a model where uncertainty differentially decreases the moral costs of unethical behavior, and benchmark the demand curve for moral ignorance against a morally neutral context. In line with the model, selfishness is a main determinant of moral ignorance, and the demand curve for moral ignorance is highly elastic when information shifts from being costly to incentivized. Moral ignorance is considered morally inappropriate. Providing this information increases moral behavior but does not shift the demand curve for ignorance.
Subjects: 
information avoidance
morality
unethical behavior
social norms
JEL: 
D83
D91
C91
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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