Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19120
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dc.contributor.authorBüttner, Thiessen_US
dc.contributor.authorHauptmeier, Sebastianen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchwager, Roberten_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:55:12Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:55:12Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19120-
dc.description.abstractRecent literature has emphasized that redistributive grant systems may tend to internalizefiscal externalities arising from tax competition. This paper further explores the conditionsunder which local grant systems enforced by the state government will enhance efficiency. Asystem of redistributive grants among governments is introduced into a standard model of taxcompetition. This basic model is then extended in order to allow for variations in thegovernment objectives at the state level. A subsequent empirical analysis of local tax policyexploits the experience with local fiscal revenue sharing in Germany. The results suggest thatattempts of state level governments to extract fiscal resources from the local revenue sharingsystem exert an upward pressure on tax rates.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1656en_US
dc.subject.jelH71en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordfiscal equalizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordtax competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordfiscal federalismen_US
dc.subject.keywordGermanyen_US
dc.subject.stwKommunaler Finanzausgleichen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerwettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzföderalismusen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden_US
dc.titleEfficient revenue sharing and upper level governments : theory and application to Germanyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn510016707en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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