Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/191050
Autoren: 
Konrad, Kai A.
Cusack, Thomas R.
Datum: 
2014
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Journal of conflict resolution [ISSN:] 1552-8766 [Publisher:] Sage Publications [Place:] Thousand Oaks, CA [Volume:] 58 [Year:] 2014 [Issue:] 5 [Pages:] 920-940
Zusammenfassung: 
What is the strategic role of membership in an intergovernmental group with unanimity requirements if the group negotiates with an external player in a setting with incomplete information? Being in such a group has a strategic effect compared to negotiating as a stand-alone player and reduces the demands of the outside player. Group membership lends additional bargaining power. Negotiating as a group may also cause more inefficiencies due to bargaining failure, and this may harm also the intergovernmental group. We uncover the role of preference alignment and preference independence between members of the coalition group for equilibrium payoffs and welfare effects. In this analysis, we also distinguish between coalition groups with and without side payments. Overall, coalition groups tend to perform well for the members of the coalition group in comparison to fully decentralized negotiations, particularly if the objectives of the members of the coalition group are not always perfectly aligned.
Schlagwörter: 
bargaining
incomplete information
coalitions
groups
strategic bargaining power
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Sonstige Angaben: 
Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG-geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz frei zugänglich / This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.
Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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