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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 1632
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
The paper examines the scope for mutually beneficial intergenerational cooperation, and looks at various attempts to theoretically explain the emergence of norms and institutions that facilitate this cooperation. After establishing a normative framework, we examine the properties of the laissez-faire solution in a pure market economy, and in one where reproductive decisions and intergenerational transfers are governed by self-enforcing family constitutions. We then show that first and second-best policies include a pension and a child benefit scheme. Finally, we look at the possibility that intergenerational redistribution might be supported by either a constitution, or some kind of voting equilibrium.
Schlagwörter: 
intergenerational cooperation
family
fertility
saving
private transfers
education
child benefits
pensions
self-enforcing constitutions
JEL: 
J1
I2
H5
H31
D7
D91
D82
H2
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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