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dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.en
dc.contributor.authorLeininger, Wolfgangen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:52Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:52Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19073-
dc.description.abstractWe characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort andsequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into agroup of players who choose their efforts ?early? and a group of players who choose ?late?.Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. Thispayoff depends on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choiceof timing can be endogenized, in which case the strongest player typically chooses ?late?,whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing. In the mostprominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zeroaggregate cost.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1609en
dc.subject.jelD74en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordsequential all-pay auctionen
dc.subject.keywordcomplete informationen
dc.subject.keywordgeneralized costen
dc.subject.keywordgeneralized Stackelberg gameen
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen
dc.subject.stwVollkommene Informationen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwKostenen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThegeneralized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn509694217en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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