Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19073
Autor:innen: 
Konrad, Kai A.
Leininger, Wolfgang
Datum: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 1609
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts ?early? and a group of players who choose ?late?. Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. This payoff depends on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choice of timing can be endogenized, in which case the strongest player typically chooses ?late?, whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing. In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zero aggregate cost.
Schlagwörter: 
sequential all-pay auction
complete information
generalized cost
generalized Stackelberg game
JEL: 
D74
D72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
199.72 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.