Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19054 
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dc.contributor.authorParigi, Bruno Mariaen
dc.contributor.authorPelizzon, Lorianaen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:44Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:44Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19054-
dc.description.abstractWe consider a mean-variance general equilibrium economy where the expected returns forcontrolling and non-controlling shareholders are different because the former are able todivert a fraction of the profits. We find that when investor protection is poor, asset returncorrelation affects ownership structure in a positive way. Higher return correlation lowers thebenefits of diversification which causes a higher investment by the controlling shareholder inhis asset and a lower investment by the non-controlling shareholders. The empirical analysissupports the predictions of the model. In particular, controlling for measures of the quality ofthe investor protection, the legal origin of the countries, and other structural variables as in aprevious study by La Porta et al. (1998) we find that equity ownership is significantly moreconcentrated in countries where stock return correlation is higher, and that the magnitude ofthis effect is larger in countries where investor protection is poorer.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1590en
dc.subject.jelG2en
dc.subject.jelD8en
dc.subject.jelG3en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcorporate governanceen
dc.subject.keywordinvestor protectionen
dc.subject.keywordprivate benefitsen
dc.subject.keyworddiversification opportunitiesen
dc.subject.stwCorporate Governanceen
dc.subject.stwEigentümerstrukturen
dc.subject.stwAnlegerschutzen
dc.subject.stwKapitalertragen
dc.subject.stwKorrelationen
dc.subject.stwPortfolio-Managementen
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.titleDiversification and ownership concentration-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn503743887en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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