Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19054
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dc.contributor.authorParigi, Bruno Mariaen_US
dc.contributor.authorPelizzon, Lorianaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:44Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:44Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19054-
dc.description.abstractWe consider a mean-variance general equilibrium economy where the expected returns forcontrolling and non-controlling shareholders are different because the former are able todivert a fraction of the profits. We find that when investor protection is poor, asset returncorrelation affects ownership structure in a positive way. Higher return correlation lowers thebenefits of diversification which causes a higher investment by the controlling shareholder inhis asset and a lower investment by the non-controlling shareholders. The empirical analysissupports the predictions of the model. In particular, controlling for measures of the quality ofthe investor protection, the legal origin of the countries, and other structural variables as in aprevious study by La Porta et al. (1998) we find that equity ownership is significantly moreconcentrated in countries where stock return correlation is higher, and that the magnitude ofthis effect is larger in countries where investor protection is poorer.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1590en_US
dc.subject.jelG2en_US
dc.subject.jelD8en_US
dc.subject.jelG3en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcorporate governanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordinvestor protectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordprivate benefitsen_US
dc.subject.keyworddiversification opportunitiesen_US
dc.subject.stwCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subject.stwEigentümerstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwAnlegerschutzen_US
dc.subject.stwKapitalertragen_US
dc.subject.stwKorrelationen_US
dc.subject.stwPortfolio-Managementen_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titleDiversification and ownership concentrationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn503743887en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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