Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19049
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dc.contributor.authorKotsogiannis, Christosen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchwager, Roberten_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:42Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:42Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19049-
dc.description.abstractConventional wisdom has it that policy innovation is better promoted in a federal rather thanin a unitary system. Recent research, however, has provided theoretical evidence to thecontrary: a multi-jurisdictional system is characterized - due to the existence of a horizontalinformation externality - by under-provision of policy innovation. This paper presents asimple model that introduces political competition for federal office. Under such competitionpolitical actors use the innovative policies in order to signal ability to the electorate. In theequilibrium analyzed policy innovation may occur more frequently than in a unitary system. Itis thus shown that, once electoral motives are accounted for, the conventional wisdom islikely to be a valid proposition.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1585en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.jelR59en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordfiscal federalismen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolicy innovationen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolicy experimentationen_US
dc.subject.stwFöderalismusen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwInnovationen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOn the incentives to experiment in federationsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn503740160en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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