Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/190487 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers No. MT-DP - 2017/26
Publisher: 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Budapest
Abstract: 
We consider two variants of the classical Stable Roommates problem with Incomplete (but strictly ordered) preference lists (SRI) that are degree constrained, i.e., preference lists are of bounded length. The first variant, egal d-SRI, involves finding an egalitarian stable matching in solvable instances of SRI with preference lists of length at most d. We show that this problem is NP-hard even if d = 3. On the positive side we give a 2d+3 / 7-approximation algorithm for d {3, 4, 5} which improves on the known bound of 2 for the unbounded preference list case. In the second variant of SRI, called d-SRTI, preference lists can include ties and are of length at most d. We show that the problem of deciding whether an instance of d-SRTI admits a stable matching is NP-complete even if d = 3. We also consider the "most stable" version of this problem and prove a strong inapproximability bound for the d = 3 case. However for d = 2 we show that the latter problem can be solved in polynomial time.
Subjects: 
stable matching
bounded length preference lists
complexity
approximation algorithm
JEL: 
C63
C78
ISBN: 
978-615-5457-16-6
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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