Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/190471 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers No. MT-DP - 2017/10
Verlag: 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Budapest
Zusammenfassung: 
We provide experimental evidence that panic bank runs occur in the absence of problems with fundamentals and coordination failures among depositors, the two main culprits identified in the literature. Depositors withdraw when they observe that others do so, even when theoretically they should not. Our findings suggest that panic also manifests itself in the beliefs of depositors, who overestimate the probability that a bank run is underway. Loss-aversion has a predictive power on panic behavior, while risk or ambiguity aversion do not.
Schlagwörter: 
bank runs
beliefs
panic
coordination
observability
loss aversion
JEL: 
C7
C9
D8
G2
ISBN: 
978-615-5594-92-2
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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