Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19042
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Konrad, Kai A. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Skaperdas, Stergios | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:54:39Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:54:39Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19042 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We examine a stark setting in which security or protection can be provided by self-governinggroups or by for-profit entrepreneurs (kings, kleptocrats, or mafia dons). Though selfgovernanceis best for the population, it faces problems of long-term viability. Typically, inproviding security the equilibrium market structure involves competing lords, a condition thatleads to a tragedy of coercion: all the savings from the provision of collective protection aredissipated and welfare can be as low as, or even lower than, in the absence of the state. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1578 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H10 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D70 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D30 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | property rights | en |
dc.subject.keyword | anarchy | en |
dc.subject.keyword | government | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kriminalitätsökonomik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Innere Sicherheit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Sicherheitsgewerbe | en |
dc.subject.stw | Organisierte Kriminalität | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | The market for protection and the origin of the state | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 503713147 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Datei(en):
Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.