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dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.en
dc.contributor.authorSkaperdas, Stergiosen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:39Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:39Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19042-
dc.description.abstractWe examine a stark setting in which security or protection can be provided by self-governinggroups or by for-profit entrepreneurs (kings, kleptocrats, or mafia dons). Though selfgovernanceis best for the population, it faces problems of long-term viability. Typically, inproviding security the equilibrium market structure involves competing lords, a condition thatleads to a tragedy of coercion: all the savings from the provision of collective protection aredissipated and welfare can be as low as, or even lower than, in the absence of the state.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1578en
dc.subject.jelH10en
dc.subject.jelD70en
dc.subject.jelD30en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordproperty rightsen
dc.subject.keywordanarchyen
dc.subject.keywordgovernmenten
dc.subject.stwKriminalitätsökonomiken
dc.subject.stwInnere Sicherheiten
dc.subject.stwSicherheitsgewerbeen
dc.subject.stwOrganisierte Kriminalitäten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe market for protection and the origin of the state-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn503713147en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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