Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19042
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSkaperdas, Stergiosen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:39Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:39Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19042-
dc.description.abstractWe examine a stark setting in which security or protection can be provided by self-governinggroups or by for-profit entrepreneurs (kings, kleptocrats, or mafia dons). Though selfgovernanceis best for the population, it faces problems of long-term viability. Typically, inproviding security the equilibrium market structure involves competing lords, a condition thatleads to a tragedy of coercion: all the savings from the provision of collective protection aredissipated and welfare can be as low as, or even lower than, in the absence of the state.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1578en_US
dc.subject.jelH10en_US
dc.subject.jelD70en_US
dc.subject.jelD30en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordproperty rightsen_US
dc.subject.keywordanarchyen_US
dc.subject.keywordgovernmenten_US
dc.subject.stwKriminalitätsökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwInnere Sicherheiten_US
dc.subject.stwSicherheitsgewerbeen_US
dc.subject.stwOrganisierte Kriminalitäten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe market for protection and the origin of the stateen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn503713147en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

Files in This Item:
File
Size
279.94 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.