Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19028
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dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorKovenock, Danen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:33Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:33Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19028-
dc.description.abstractWe characterize the unique Markov perfect equilibrium of a tug-of-war without exogenousnoise, in which players have the opportunity to engage in a sequence of battles in an attemptto win the war. Each battle is an all-pay auction in which the player expending the greaterresources wins. In equilibrium, contest effort concentrates on at most two adjacent states ofthe game, the "tipping states", which are determined by the contestants' relative strengths,their distances to final victory, and the discount factor. In these states battle outcomes arestochastic due to endogenous randomization. Both relative strength and closeness to victoryincrease the probability of winning the battle at hand. Patience reduces the role of distance indetermining outcomes.Applications range from politics, economics and sports, to biology, where the equilibriumbehavior finds empirical support: many species have developed mechanisms such ashierarchies or other organizational structures by which the allocation of prizes are governedby possibly repeated conflict. Our results contribute to an explanation why. Compared to asingle-stage conflict, such structures can reduce the overall resources that are dissipatedamong the group of players.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich-
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1564en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordwinner-take-allen_US
dc.subject.keywordall-pay auctionen_US
dc.subject.keywordtippingen_US
dc.subject.keywordmulti-stage contesten_US
dc.subject.keyworddynamic gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordpreemptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordconflicten_US
dc.subject.keyworddominanceen_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwRationales Verhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwDynamisches Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleEquilibrium and efficiency in the tug-of-waren_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn50368998Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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