Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19020
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dc.contributor.authorAlesina, Albertoen_US
dc.contributor.authorTabellini, Guidoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:30Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:30Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19020-
dc.description.abstractMany countries, especially developing ones, follow procyclical fiscal policies, namelyspending goes up (taxes go down) in booms and spending goes down (taxes go up) inrecessions. We provide an explanation for this suboptimal fiscal policy based upon politicaldistortions and incentives for less-than-benevolent government to appropriate rents. Votershave incentives similar to the "starving the Leviathan" classic argument, and demand morepublic goods or fewer taxes to prevent governments from appropriating rents when theeconomy is doing well. We test this argument against more traditional explanations basedpurely on borrowing constraints, with a reasonable amount of success.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1556en_US
dc.subject.jelH6en_US
dc.subject.jelH3en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwKonjunkturen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwOECD-Staatenen_US
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungsländeren_US
dc.titleWhy is fiscal policy often procyclical?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn503671800en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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