Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19020 
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dc.contributor.authorAlesina, Albertoen
dc.contributor.authorTabellini, Guidoen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:30Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:30Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19020-
dc.description.abstractMany countries, especially developing ones, follow procyclical fiscal policies, namelyspending goes up (taxes go down) in booms and spending goes down (taxes go up) inrecessions. We provide an explanation for this suboptimal fiscal policy based upon politicaldistortions and incentives for less-than-benevolent government to appropriate rents. Votershave incentives similar to the "starving the Leviathan" classic argument, and demand morepublic goods or fewer taxes to prevent governments from appropriating rents when theeconomy is doing well. We test this argument against more traditional explanations basedpurely on borrowing constraints, with a reasonable amount of success.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1556en
dc.subject.jelH6en
dc.subject.jelH3en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken
dc.subject.stwKonjunkturen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwOECD-Staatenen
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungsländeren
dc.titleWhy is fiscal policy often procyclical?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn503671800en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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