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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19018
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | de Bijl, Paul W. J. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:54:29Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:54:29Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19018 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper presents a basic framework to assess whether structural (vertical) separation isdesirable. It is discussed within the setting of fixed telecommunications markets. From aneconomist's perspective, the key question that underlies the case for structural separation is: isthere a persistent bottleneck? The obvious candidate is the ?local loop?, or local accessnetwork. If yes then it makes sense to compare the costs and benefits of structural separation.The framework provides a set of options that the regulator can use strategically, by using thethreat of a break-up to influence an incumbent's competitive stance in the wholesale market. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1554 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L12 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L51 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L4 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L96 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.stw | Telekommunikation | en |
dc.subject.stw | Betriebsaufspaltung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Netzzugang | en |
dc.subject.stw | Telekommunikationspolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Structural separation and access in telecommunications markets | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 503670634 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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