Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/190085
Authors: 
Canelas, Carla
Niño-Zarazúa, Miguel
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
WIDER Working Paper 2018/36
Abstract: 
In 2006, the Bolivian government introduced a large-scale cash transfer programme, Bono Juancito Pinto (BJP). Exploiting the exogenous variation of the programme expansion, this paper examines the impact of BJP on schooling and child labour. The analysis suggests that the transfer increases the likelihood of school enrolment but has no sizeable effect on the incidence of child labour. The results are in line with theoretical models that predict that if leisure and schooling decisions are substitutes, a school incentive will have either positive or neutral effects on child labour. Our findings support previous evidence that schooling and work decisions are not perfect substitutes among children.
Subjects: 
Bolivia
child labour
conditional cash transfers
schooling
JEL: 
I25
I38
J13
J22
N36
ISBN: 
978-92-9256-478-0
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Social Media Mentions:

Files in This Item:
File
Size
256.16 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.