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dc.contributor.authorGraziano, Claraen
dc.contributor.authorLuporini, Annalisaen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:25Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:25Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19007-
dc.description.abstractThe paper analyzes the optimal structure of the board of directors in a firm with a largeshareholder sitting on the board. In a one-tier structure the sole board performs all tasks, whilein a two-tier structure the management board is in charge of project selection and thesupervisory board is in charge of monitoring. We consider the case in which the largeshareholder sits on (and controls) the supervisory board but not on the management board.We show that such a two-tier structure can limit the interference of the large shareholder andcan restore manager's incentive to exert effort to become informed on new investmentprojects without reducing the large shareholder's incentive to monitor the manager. Thisresults in higher expected profits. The difference in profits can be sufficiently high to makethe large shareholder prefer a two-tier board even if this implies that the manager selects hisown preferred project. The paper has interesting policy implications since it suggests that twotierboards can be a valuable option in Continental Europe where ownership structure isconcentrated. It also offers support to some recent corporate governance reforms (like the socalledVietti reform in Italy) that have introduced the possibility to choose between one-tierand two-tier structure of boards for listed firms.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1543en
dc.subject.jelG34en
dc.subject.jelL22en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordboard of directorsen
dc.subject.keyworddual boarden
dc.subject.keywordcorporate governanceen
dc.subject.keywordmonitoringen
dc.subject.keywordproject choiceen
dc.subject.stwCorporate Governanceen
dc.subject.stwEigentümerstrukturen
dc.subject.stwVorstanden
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwGroßaktionären
dc.titleOwnership concentration, monitoring and optimal board structure-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn500854688en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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