Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19007
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorGraziano, Claraen_US
dc.contributor.authorLuporini, Annalisaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:25Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:25Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19007-
dc.description.abstractThe paper analyzes the optimal structure of the board of directors in a firm with a largeshareholder sitting on the board. In a one-tier structure the sole board performs all tasks, whilein a two-tier structure the management board is in charge of project selection and thesupervisory board is in charge of monitoring. We consider the case in which the largeshareholder sits on (and controls) the supervisory board but not on the management board.We show that such a two-tier structure can limit the interference of the large shareholder andcan restore manager's incentive to exert effort to become informed on new investmentprojects without reducing the large shareholder's incentive to monitor the manager. Thisresults in higher expected profits. The difference in profits can be sufficiently high to makethe large shareholder prefer a two-tier board even if this implies that the manager selects hisown preferred project. The paper has interesting policy implications since it suggests that twotierboards can be a valuable option in Continental Europe where ownership structure isconcentrated. It also offers support to some recent corporate governance reforms (like the socalledVietti reform in Italy) that have introduced the possibility to choose between one-tierand two-tier structure of boards for listed firms.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1543en_US
dc.subject.jelG34en_US
dc.subject.jelL22en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordboard of directorsen_US
dc.subject.keyworddual boarden_US
dc.subject.keywordcorporate governanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordmonitoringen_US
dc.subject.keywordproject choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subject.stwEigentümerstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwVorstanden_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwGroßaktionären_US
dc.titleOwnership concentration, monitoring and optimal board structureen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn500854688en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.