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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/19000
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Buchholz, Wolfgang | en |
dc.contributor.author | Peters, Wolfgang | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:54:22Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:54:22Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19000 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The Lindahl equilibrium is mostly motivated by a rather artificial price mechanism. Eventhough the analogy to a competitive market has been emphasised by Lindahl himself hisapproach does not directly explain the normative ideas, which are behind this concept. In thepresent paper we therefore show how the Lindahl equilibrium can be deduced from somesimple equity axioms that in particular are related to the equal sacrifice principle and a nonenvypostulate as norms for distributional equity. Fairness among agents with differentpreferences is taken into account by considering their marginal willingnesses to pay as virtualprices. In this way it might also become more understandable why the Lindahl solution can beperceived as an outcome of fair cooperation. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1536 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H41 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D63 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C78 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | public goods | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Lindahl equilibrium | en |
dc.subject.keyword | fairness | en |
dc.subject.keyword | equity | en |
dc.subject.stw | Öffentliches Gut | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gleichgewichtstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verteilungsgerechtigkeit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Verhandlungstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gerechtigkeit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Justifying the Lindahl solution as an outcome of fair cooperation | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 500850879 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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