Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19000
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dc.contributor.authorBuchholz, Wolfgangen_US
dc.contributor.authorPeters, Wolfgangen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:22Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:22Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19000-
dc.description.abstractThe Lindahl equilibrium is mostly motivated by a rather artificial price mechanism. Eventhough the analogy to a competitive market has been emphasised by Lindahl himself hisapproach does not directly explain the normative ideas, which are behind this concept. In thepresent paper we therefore show how the Lindahl equilibrium can be deduced from somesimple equity axioms that in particular are related to the equal sacrifice principle and a nonenvypostulate as norms for distributional equity. Fairness among agents with differentpreferences is taken into account by considering their marginal willingnesses to pay as virtualprices. In this way it might also become more understandable why the Lindahl solution can beperceived as an outcome of fair cooperation.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1536en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordLindahl equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordfairnessen_US
dc.subject.keywordequityen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichtstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwVerteilungsgerechtigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleJustifying the Lindahl solution as an outcome of fair cooperationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn500850879en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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