Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/189990 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
WIDER Working Paper No. 2017/145
Publisher: 
The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), Helsinki
Abstract: 
Social engineering refers to deliberate attempts, often under the form of legislative moves, to promote changes in customs and norms that hurt the interests of marginalized population groups. This paper explores the analytical conditions under which social engineering is more or less likely to succeed than more indirect approaches when it comes to suppress genderbiased customs. This implies discussing the main possible interaction frameworks leading to antiwomen equilibria, and deriving policy implications from the corresponding games. The theoretical arguments are illustrated by examples drawn from available empirical works, thus providing a reasoned survey of the literature.
Subjects: 
social norms
harmful customs
gender
coordination incentives
expressive function of law
deterrence
JEL: 
D10
K10
K36
O15
Z10
Z13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
978-92-9256-371-4
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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