Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/189973 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
WIDER Working Paper No. 2017/128
Publisher: 
The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), Helsinki
Abstract: 
This paper studies whether increasing the wife's bargaining power results in couples allocating more resources to their child, and, if so, what the underlying mechanisms for this are. We conduct a novel between-subject lab experiment in Tanzania, in which we vary the relative bargaining power between spouses. The paper provides two main insights. First, increasing the wife's bargaining power does not result in an increase in the allocation to the child, but it does lead to equal allocations to boys and girls. Second, time preferences are important; it is more beneficial for the child that the most patient spouse has most bargaining power.
Subjects: 
intra-household allocation
female bargaining power
Tanzania
JEL: 
C92
D13
J13
O12
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
978-92-9256-354-7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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