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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18992
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Breitscheidel, Jörg | en |
dc.contributor.author | Gersbach, Hans | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:54:18Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:54:18Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18992 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We explore the design of self-financing tax/subsidy mechanisms to solve hold-up problems inenvironmental regulation. Under Cournot competition, announcing the subsidy rate seems tobe preferable to announcing the tax rate. Moreover, for constant marginal damage the hold-upproblem can always be solved by setting subsidies. Under Bertrand competition, onlyannouncing the tax rate can induce at least one firm to invest. We suggest that feebate systemsin the automotive sector should be designed as self-financing tax/subsidy mechanisms. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1528 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D43 | en |
dc.subject.jel | Q28 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L50 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D62 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | hold-up problems | en |
dc.subject.keyword | environmental regulation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | taxes and subsidies | en |
dc.subject.keyword | self-financing mechanisms | en |
dc.subject.keyword | emission control | en |
dc.subject.stw | Umweltpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Umweltabgabe | en |
dc.subject.stw | Subvention | en |
dc.subject.stw | Steueraufkommen | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wohlfahrtseffekt | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | hold-up problems | en |
dc.title | Self-financing environmental mechanisms | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 500828423 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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