Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/189918 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
School of Economics Discussion Papers No. 1807
Verlag: 
University of Kent, School of Economics, Canterbury
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the pay of UK universities chief executives ("vice-chancellors") over a ten year period. Although there is a correlation between pay and performance, with better performing institutions paying higher salaries, we find limited evidence that this relationship is causal; that is, we find no statistically significant link that a change in pay leads to a change in performance, or vice-versa. Instead, we find strong support for an asymmetric benchmarking behaviour, where those institutions with below average pay increase their vice-chancellor's salaries quicker than those with above average pay. We simulate a model whereby different institutions target different places of the distribution of salaries and demonstrate that inflation of pay can be explained by this behaviour.
Schlagwörter: 
Executive Compensation
Performance Pay
Efficiency Wages
Benchmark
JEL: 
G3
J33
Z13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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