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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18978
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Khalil, Fahad | en |
dc.contributor.author | Martimort, David | en |
dc.contributor.author | Parigi, Bruno Maria | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:54:12Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:54:12Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18978 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We study the problem of multiple principals who want to obtain income from a privatelyinformed agent and design their contracts non-cooperatively. Our analysis reveals that thedegree of coordination between principals has strong implications for the shapes of contractsand the amount of monitoring. Equity-like contracts and excessive monitoring emerge whenprincipals are able to coordinate monitoring or verify each others? monitoring efforts. Whenthis is not possible, free riding in monitoring weakens the incentive to monitor, so that flatpayments, debt-like contracts and very low levels of monitoring appear. Free riding may be sostrong that there may even be less monitoring than if the principals cooperated with eachother, which shows that non-cooperative monitoring does not necessarily lead to excessivemonitoring. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1514 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G3 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G2 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D8 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D2 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | monitoring | en |
dc.subject.keyword | common agency | en |
dc.subject.keyword | costly state verification | en |
dc.subject.stw | Agency Theory | en |
dc.subject.stw | Leistungskontrolle | en |
dc.subject.stw | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Trittbrettfahrerverhalten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Finanzierungstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Monitoring a common agent : implications for financial contracting | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 500538069 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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