Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18978 
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dc.contributor.authorKhalil, Fahaden
dc.contributor.authorMartimort, Daviden
dc.contributor.authorParigi, Bruno Mariaen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:12Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:12Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18978-
dc.description.abstractWe study the problem of multiple principals who want to obtain income from a privatelyinformed agent and design their contracts non-cooperatively. Our analysis reveals that thedegree of coordination between principals has strong implications for the shapes of contractsand the amount of monitoring. Equity-like contracts and excessive monitoring emerge whenprincipals are able to coordinate monitoring or verify each others? monitoring efforts. Whenthis is not possible, free riding in monitoring weakens the incentive to monitor, so that flatpayments, debt-like contracts and very low levels of monitoring appear. Free riding may be sostrong that there may even be less monitoring than if the principals cooperated with eachother, which shows that non-cooperative monitoring does not necessarily lead to excessivemonitoring.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1514en
dc.subject.jelG3en
dc.subject.jelG2en
dc.subject.jelD8en
dc.subject.jelD2en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordmonitoringen
dc.subject.keywordcommon agencyen
dc.subject.keywordcostly state verificationen
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwLeistungskontrolleen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwFinanzierungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleMonitoring a common agent : implications for financial contracting-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn500538069en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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