Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18966
Authors: 
Matschke, Xenia
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 1502
Abstract: 
A standard finding in the political economy of trade policy literature is that we should expect export-oriented industries to attract more assistance than import-competing industries. In reality, however, trade policy is heavily biased toward supporting import industries. This paper shows within a standard protection for sale framework, how the costliness of raising revenue via taxation may make export subsidies less desirable and import tariffs more desirable. The model is then estimated and its predictions are tested using U.S. tariff data. An empirical estimate of the costliness of revenue-raising is also obtained.
Subjects: 
protection for sale
tariffs
trade protection
JEL: 
F16
F13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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