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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18964
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Amegashie, J. Atsu | en |
dc.contributor.author | Runkel, Marco | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:54:07Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:54:07Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18964 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper studies sabotage in a contest with non-identical players. Unlike previous papers, we consider sabotage in an elimination contest and allow contestants to sabotage a potential or future rival. It turns out that for a certain partition of players there is a pure-strategy equilibrium in which only the most able contestant engages in sabotage while less able contestants do not. The most able contestant may therefore prefer a situation where sabotage is allowed to one where sabotage is not allowed. For another partition of players, there is a unique equilibrium in which none of the players invests in sabotage. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1500 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D74 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | all-pay auction | en |
dc.subject.keyword | elimination contests | en |
dc.subject.keyword | potential rival | en |
dc.subject.keyword | sabotage | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wirtschaftskriminalität | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wettbewerb | en |
dc.subject.stw | Auktionstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Spieltheorie | en |
dc.title | Sabotaging potential rivals | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 500517312 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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