Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18955
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dc.contributor.authorHuber, Bernden_US
dc.contributor.authorRunkel, Marcoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:54:03Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:54:03Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18955-
dc.description.abstractEmpirical evidence from the U.S. and the European Union suggests that regions whichcontribute to interregional redistribution face weaker borrowing constraints than regionswhich benefit from interregional redistribution. This paper presents an argument in favor ofsuch differentiated budgetary institutions. It develops a two-period model of a federationconsisting of two types of regions. The federal government redistributes from one type ofregions (contributors) to the other type (recipients). It is shown that a fiscal constitution withlax budget rules for contributors and strict budget rules for recipients solves the self-selectionproblem the federal government faces in the presence of asymmetric information regardingexogenous characteristics of the regions.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1491en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.jelH74en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordinterregional redistributionen_US
dc.subject.keywordborrowing rulesen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzausgleichen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Schuldenen_US
dc.subject.stwRegionen_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzföderalismusen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleInterregional redistribution and budget institutions under asymmetric informationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn500467706en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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