Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/189441 
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Erscheinungsjahr: 
1995
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 95-16
Verlag: 
University of California, Department of Economics, Davis, CA
Zusammenfassung: 
We argue that large games are of analytical interest partly because they can be understood in terms of a unifying condition of incentive-compatibility, strategyproofness. In contrast to finite games, strategy-proofness applies not only to dominantstrategy equilibria, but also to a large class of Nash equilibria and to Bayesian Nash equilibria with independent types. Based on Kolmogorov''s zero-one law, it is also shown that Bayesian Nash equilibria coincide with a class of Nash equilibria in games of incomplete information when there is a countably infinite number of players and types are independent.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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