Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18938
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dc.contributor.authorGottardi, Pieroen_US
dc.contributor.authorSerrano, Robertoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:56Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:56Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18938-
dc.description.abstractWe study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informedover common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of buyers and a finitenumber n of sellers. All buyers are uninformed, while at least one seller is privately informedabout the true state of the world. When n = 1, full information revelation never occurs inequilibrium and the only information transmission happens in the first period. With n > 1 theoutcome depends both on the structure of the sellers? information and, even more importantly,on the intensity of competition allowed by the trading rules. When there is intensecompetition (absence of clienteles), information is fully and immediately revealed to thebuyers in every equilibrium for n large enough, regardless of the number of informed sellers.On the other hand, for trading arrangements characterized by less intense forms ofcompetition (presence of clienteles), for any n we always have equilibria where information isnever fully revealed. Moreover, in that case, when only one seller is informed, for manyparameter configurations there are no equilibria with full information revelation, even forlarge n.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1300en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformation revelationen_US
dc.subject.keyworddynamic tradingen_US
dc.subject.keywordoligopolistic competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordclientelesen_US
dc.subject.stwMarktmechanismusen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwOligopolen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleMarket power and information revelation in dynamic tradingen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn856969028en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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