Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/189372 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper No. 1096
Publisher: 
Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)
Abstract: 
We consider costly administration at the center of a farming community surrounding a fortified village. Land rent taxation is high cost mode of financing central administration in a tax incidence sense. Participatory administration by the governed is a lower cost alternative. We speculate why the low cost option has been out-competed by its higher cost alternative throughout history. We also take up constraints on predation on farmers by a landlord at the center.
Subjects: 
administrative structure
public goods
welfare cost
JEL: 
H41
H11
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.