Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18932
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dc.contributor.authorFeld, Lars P.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSchaltegger, Christoph A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:53Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:53Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18932-
dc.description.abstractThe fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spendingand indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher itsspending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can bemitigated by different fiscal or constitutional institutions. We distinguish between twovariants of fragmented governments: cabinet size and coalition size. Theoretically, they bothdescribe the degree to which the costs of spending decisions are internalized by individualdecision-makers. In addition, we evaluate whether constitutional rules for executive andlegislation as well as budget rules shape the size of government and how the different rulesinteract with fragmentation in determining government size. The empirical study of the role offragmented governments for fiscal policy outcomes is based on a panel of the 26 Swisscantons over the 1980-1998 period. The results indicate that the number of ministers in thecabinet is negatively associated with fiscal discipline. Furthermore, the fiscal referendum doeseffectively restrict the fiscal commons problem, but less successfully than the budget rule.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1294en_US
dc.subject.jelH61en_US
dc.subject.jelE63en_US
dc.subject.jelE61en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordfragmentationen_US
dc.subject.keywordfiscal policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordreferendumsen_US
dc.subject.keywordlegislative rulesen_US
dc.subject.keywordbudget rulesen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwRegierungen_US
dc.subject.stwRegierungskoalitionen_US
dc.subject.stwStaatsquoteen_US
dc.subject.stwHaushaltskonsolidierungen_US
dc.subject.stwRegelgebundene Politiken_US
dc.subject.stwReferendumen_US
dc.subject.stwSchweizen_US
dc.titleDo large cabinets favor large governments? : evidence from Swiss sub-federal jurisdictionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn856955043en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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