Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/189317
Authors: 
Dunbar, Geoffrey
Tu, Juan
Wang, Ruqu
Wang, Xiaoting
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper No. 1033
Abstract: 
In this paper, we re-examine various previous experimental studies of the Centipede Game in the literature. These experiments found that players rarely follow the subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies of the game, and various modifications to the game were proposed to explain the outcomes of the experiments. We here offer yet another modification. Players have a choice of whether or not to believe that their opponents use subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies. We define a `behavioral equilibrium' for this game. This equilibrium concept can reproduce the outcomes of those experiments.
Subjects: 
centipede games
game theory
experimental economics
behavioral economics
JEL: 
C72
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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