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|dc.description.abstract||Research in behavioral economics has uncovered the widespread phenomenon of peoplemaking decisions against their own good intentions. In these situations, the government mightwant to intervene, indeed individuals might want the government to intervene, to inducebehavior that is closer to what individuals wish they were doing. The analysis of suchcorrective interventions, through taxes and subsidies, might be called ?behavioral publiceconomics.? However, such analysis, where the government has an objective function that isdifferent from that of individuals, is not new in public economics. In these cases thegovernment is said to be ?non-welfarist? in its objectives, and there is a long tradition of nonwelfaristwelfare economics, especially the analysis of optimal taxation and subsidy policywhere the outcomes of individual behavior are evaluated using a preference function differentfrom the one that generated the outcomes. The object of this paper is to first of all present aunified view of the non-welfarist optimal taxation literature and, secondly, to presentbehavioral public economics as a natural special case of this general framework.||en_US|
|dc.publisher|||aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich||en_US|
|dc.relation.ispartofseries|||aCESifo Working Paper |x1291||en_US|
|dc.title||Non-welfarist optimal taxation and behavioral public economics||en_US|
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