Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/189278 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper No. 988
Publisher: 
Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)
Abstract: 
This paper examines efficient and equilibrium allocations in an economy where agents with diverse characteristics are matched through a time-consuming process to produce output. This is cast in a labour market where workers of different skills match with machines of different qualities. The efficient assignment is not always positively assortative and can be decentralized by a competitive mechanism where firms compete by posting wages and committing to the skill that their chosen machines are intended for. Implications on wage inequality are examined.
Subjects: 
Matching
Efficiency
Frictions
Skills: Wage inequality
JEL: 
D33
J31
L11
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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