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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18926
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Maffei, Sandro | en |
dc.contributor.author | Raabe, Nikolai | en |
dc.contributor.author | Ursprung, Heinrich W. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T15:53:51Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T15:53:51Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18926 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Most normative studies on child labor arrive at the conclusion that child labor is detrimentalto social welfare. Child labor is, however, still prevalent in many developing countries eventhough in many of these countries it is forbidden by law. In this paper we develop a politicaleconomicmodel that explains lenient enforcement of existing child labor legislation. Themost important implication of our model is that in countries with repressive political regimesenforcement is more lenient and child labor thus more prevalent than in countries enjoyingpolitical freedom. We test this implication and find that it is confirmed by the data. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1288 | en |
dc.subject.jel | K14 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | child labor | en |
dc.subject.keyword | political economy | en |
dc.subject.keyword | freedom | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kinderarbeit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Jugendarbeitsschutz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Rechtsdurchsetzung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Politische Verfolgung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Freiheit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Schätzung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Welt | en |
dc.title | Political repression and child labor : theory and empirical evidence | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 856943509 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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