Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/189268
Authors: 
Wang, Ruqu
Bag, Parimal Kanti
Dinlersoz, Emim Murat
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper No. 976
Abstract: 
A phantom bidding model is analyzed for a sale auction. The following questions are addressed: the effects of phantom bidding on overall social welfare and buyers' profits. It is shown that social welfare may increase or decrease as the auctioneer switches from the fixed reserve price policy to phantom bidding. The buyers' profits will increase whenever social welfare increases.
Subjects: 
English Auction
Phantom Bidding
Fixed/Flexible Reserve Price
JEL: 
D44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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