Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/189191 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1992
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper No. 867
Verlag: 
Queen's University, Department of Economics, Kingston (Ontario)
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider an economy in which firms' decisions are made by a collective decision of the shareholders. The main result shows that the simultaneous existence of an exchange equilibrium in the market for shares and a voting equilibrium in the internal decisions of firms. We present our results in a general framework, with a measure space of agents. Our framework covers the cases of incomplete markets and externalities between firms and shareholders. We show that a voting rule due to Kramer is a special case.
Schlagwörter: 
shareholder voting
incomplete markets
sophisticated voting
objective function of the firm
JEL: 
D52
D70
L20
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
482.29 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.