Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/189191
Authors: 
Kelsey, David
Milne, Frank
Year of Publication: 
1992
Series/Report no.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper 867
Abstract: 
We consider an economy in which firms' decisions are made by a collective decision of the shareholders. The main result shows that the simultaneous existence of an exchange equilibrium in the market for shares and a voting equilibrium in the internal decisions of firms. We present our results in a general framework, with a measure space of agents. Our framework covers the cases of incomplete markets and externalities between firms and shareholders. We show that a voting rule due to Kramer is a special case.
Subjects: 
shareholder voting
incomplete markets
sophisticated voting
objective function of the firm
JEL: 
D52
D70
L20
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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