Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18918 
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dc.contributor.authorSurico, Paoloen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:48Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:48Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18918-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the empirical relevance of a new framework for monetary policyanalysis in which the decision-makers are allowed to weight differently positive and negativedeviations of inflation and output from the target values. Reduced-form and structuralestimates of the central bank first order condition indicate that the preferences of the Fed havebeen highly asymmetric only before 1979, with the response to output contractions beinglarger than the response to output expansions of the same magnitude. This asymmetry isshown to induce an average inflation bias of 1.11% that appears to have substantiallycontributed to the great inflation of the 1960s and 1970s.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1280en
dc.subject.jelE58en
dc.subject.jelE52en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric objectiveen
dc.subject.keywordnonlinear monetary policy rulesen
dc.subject.keywordaverage inflation biasen
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitisches Zielen
dc.subject.stwInflation Targetingen
dc.subject.stwRegelgebundene Politiken
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwVereinigte Staatenen
dc.titleInflation targeting and nonlinear policy rules : the case of asymmetric preferences-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn856904007en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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