Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18918
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dc.contributor.authorSurico, Paoloen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:53:48Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:53:48Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18918-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the empirical relevance of a new framework for monetary policyanalysis in which the decision-makers are allowed to weight differently positive and negativedeviations of inflation and output from the target values. Reduced-form and structuralestimates of the central bank first order condition indicate that the preferences of the Fed havebeen highly asymmetric only before 1979, with the response to output contractions beinglarger than the response to output expansions of the same magnitude. This asymmetry isshown to induce an average inflation bias of 1.11% that appears to have substantiallycontributed to the great inflation of the 1960s and 1970s.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1280en_US
dc.subject.jelE58en_US
dc.subject.jelE52en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric objectiveen_US
dc.subject.keywordnonlinear monetary policy rulesen_US
dc.subject.keywordaverage inflation biasen_US
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitisches Zielen_US
dc.subject.stwInflation Targetingen_US
dc.subject.stwRegelgebundene Politiken_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwVereinigte Staatenen_US
dc.titleInflation targeting and nonlinear policy rules : the case of asymmetric preferencesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn856904007en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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